of Clausewitz reaches its pinnacle in those studies that attempt to portray him as an important spiritual force behind the internal German resistance to Hitler. As is so often the case with rehabilitations, however, this one too leans occasionally towards the other extreme, as for example when, with disconcerting naivet&, the reader of a popular edition of Vom Kriege is assured that, 'The First World War would have been different, the Second would probably never have taken place, would never have been allowed to take place, had those responsible studied Clausewitz carefully and drawn practical lessons from him. '7 Various and opposing factions made use of Clausewitz's theories for their own purposes. In the period under consideration, however, the importance of his ideas lies less in their purely philosophical impact than in their role as an intellectual shibboleth. For the Nazis, the name Clausewitz lent an aura of respectability to their theories, their use of him suggested an unbroken line of historical continuity from Brandenburg to Berchtesgaden. But in order to enlist his reputation, they had to do violence to his ideas. For the anti-Nazis, it was precisely this impermissible deviation from true Clausewitzian doctrine which demonstrated that the Nazis were an aberration. Those who disputed Clausewitz's spiritual legacy were thus at odds on a comparatively narrow range of topics; it was primarily the honour of standing in the mainstream of the Prussian military tradition which was at stake. Yet within this limited scope vehement disagreement was possible. This essay considers two closely related ideas in particular: first, the well-known Clausewitzian leitmotiv that war is but a continuation of politics with other means, la Formule as Raymond Aron calls it; second, the notion of 'absolute war.
II
Clausewitz's theories are widely known. It is therefore not so much their content as the ambiguity that plagues their formulation which deserves emphasis. The unfinished state of his writings at his death in 1831 has made them a treasure of often contradicting, mutually compromising statements which may submit to synthesis and harmonization at the hands of the patient scholar, but which can also be taken by the more pragmatic-minded statesman or soldier as a source of widely varying opinion. Thus, for example, everyone knows that, according to Clausewitz, war is subordinated to politics. But does this, to test one common assumption, mean that war is somehow subdued or tamed by political control, that politics act in a moderating, restraining fashion on the tempest which martial zeal left to itself would unleash? 'Thus politics', writes Clausewitz, 'makes of the all-overwhelming element of war a mere instrument. Out of the dreadful broadsword which seeks to be grasped with both hands and swung with full force, thus to strike once and for all, it fashions a light, handy sword which can on occasion even be handled as a rapier to exchange thrusts, feints and parries.'8 In the same chapter, however, he also argues that it is a misunderstanding to speak of the detrimental influence of politics on warfare. If a war is unsuccessful, then not the political influence, but rather the nature of the politics in question is to blame. 'If the politics are right, that is, if they hit their mark, then they can work only to the advantage of war . . . '. This would seem to place politics and war on equal footing and might even be construed as a reversal of the usual sense of the Formule.9
Similar problems arise concerning the idea of absolute war. For Clausewitz, absolute war is a strictly philosophical concept, an abstraction on the analogy of the Kantian Ding an sich. In its purely military essence, war is a struggle fought with all available means until one side is unable to offer any further resistance. Two rational creatures, locked in combat, both realize that the victory will go to whichever exerts the most effort. Thus a continual escalation of force follows until one is completely vanquished. True to his philosophical calling, when Clausewitz writes that, 'never can a principle of moderation be introduced into the philosophy of war itself without committing an absurdity', he is making a statement about the nature of war in a logical sense."' He is not, as he is often misunderstood to say, advocating utmost brutality as the w2y to conduct any actual war." Absolute war is the peak of the escalation of violence in the struggle between two rational creatures. It is the ideal type of war, never found in reality, which all real wars approximate but never attain. Clausewitz thought that, in his own day, Napoleonic warfare represented a new type of people's war which came much closer to the absolute form of war than the cabinet wars of the previous era.
To explain why absolute war is never met in reality, Clausewitz borrows the image of friction from physics. Not all forces can, in actuality, be deployed simultaneously, nor will those in charge of making the appropriate decisions ever be of one mind. Due to such 'modifications of reality', actual wars do not escalate to the absolute stage as a purely theory-bound consideration would expect.
Nevertheless, although Clausewitz did at one time think that all wars, however limited in scope and objective they might on occasion be, aimed at the idea of absolute war and were prevented from achieving this goal only through the interference of the frictions of reality, the development of his thought led him to argue that limited wars with circumscribed aims and motivations might represent a special class of war, one no less 'ideal' than absolute war.'2 He distinguishes various types of war in accordance with the intensity and importance of their motivations. The stronger the motives, the more every aspect of the peoples concerned is involved, the more war approaches its abstract form, the more it aims solely at crushing the enemy and, consequently, the more completely the military and political objects overlap, 'the more purely military and less political the war seems to be.' The weaker the motives, the more the war takes on a political cast. '3 Thus Clausewitz distinguishes the purely military aims of war, the aim of struggle as a theoretical concept (destruction of the enemy), from the political manoeuvres which make use of war for ends which may very well be far more modest than those dictated by military considerations. Yet he wrote in the eighth book of Vom Kriege (one he did not live to revise) that, given sufficiently urgent political motives, it is possible for political and military goals to coincide. 'If war belongs to politics, then it will assume its character. As politics become greater and mightier, so does war; this can continue to the point at which war attains its absolute form.'4 Given the ultimate motives of a battle for sheer survival, war can apparently lose its political aspect and be characterized wholly by the military goal of a completely vanquished opponent. 'It would be conceivable that the political viewpoint should lose its influence at the outbreak of war only if war were fought out of pure hatred as a struggle for life or death ... . This is not to say that, prompted by even the strongest of motivations, war is not actually political, but rather that at this extreme the political and military intentions seek one and the same object.
The point, therefore, is not that Clausewitz did not regard war as subordinate to politics or that he thought of limited wars as mere aberrations of the ideal war of utmost violence, but that his thought is genuinely ambiguous and therefore easily used and abus- Despite all attempts to proscribe war, it remains a law of nature which may be checked but never eliminated, and which serves the maintenance of the people and the state or the assurance of its historical future.
This high moral aim gives war its total character and its ethical justification. It lifts it above being a purely military act or a military duel for the sake of some economic advantage.
Stakes, winnings and losses rise to hitherto unsuspected heights. Not only damage, but the annihilation of state and people threatens the loser of any war.
Thus the war of today becomes a national emergency and a fight for survival for each individual.
Since each person has everything to win and everything to lose, each must contribute the utmost.
The use of Clausewitzian terminology at the beginning was no coincidence. The great philosopher of war was hailed also as the prophet of total war and as a star witness for the accuracy of the assertion that, 'only those nations can maintain themselves which can and are determined to throw themselves completely onto the scales of war'.39 Total war was thought of as the practical realization of absolute war, the overcoming of the 'modifications of reality'. Prompted by the strongest of motives, military and political goals coincided and utmost effort was to be expended in the attempt to destroy utterly the enemy that would not hesitate to do likewise. 'Already Clausewitz', Hitler confided to Horthy and Antonescu in 1943, 'had quite rightly labelled this uncompromising war of allies against a merciless enemy as the natural form of war and had distinguished it from those wars which are conducted like a joint-stock company, in which, instead of capital, one contributes 30,000 or 40,000 men. We must stake everything; we have everything to win or everything to lose.'40 Early in 1945, Hitler described the war he had begun in terms which all but duplicate Clausewitz's account of the logical form of war: 'In a ghastly conflict like this, in a war in which two so completely irreconcilable ideologies confront one another, the issue can inevitably only be settled by the total destruction of one side or the other. It is a fight which must be waged, by both sides, until they are utterly exhausted... ' . 41 The In strict Clausewitzian fashion, they pointed out that, since war as such has no aim other than the destruction of the enemy, it can be no more than a tool in the political workshop. 'Wars may not be waged for their own sake', Goerdeler wrote in a memorandum from 1940. 'Even Moltke emphasized this; Clausewitz and all great statesmen have acknowledged it; reason and a sense of responsibility dictate it. The goal is always and alone an honourable and equal peace.'4 'For it is precisely the aim of politics', the two continued in 1941, 'flexibly to find and determine the right thing for each step of the development. Politics therefore do not grant the soldier every form of warfare; for example, it must be evaluated whether the effect at which destruction aims brings one closer to the considered and possible goal of an advantageous peace and its desired form and whether it serves to preserve this.'5 Like many later commentators, Beck saw Hitler's conduct of the war in terms of an unrestrained, hypertrophied militarism. In a draft of his 'Aufruf an die Wehrmacht' from the fall of 1943, he wrote, in allusion to Bismarck: 'that leadership which no longer regards politics as the art of the possible and strives to attain its goal with the most sparing use of effort, but which revels in fantastic plans of limitless conquest, which recognizes no moral obligations whatsoever towards either its own people or towards others, can never arrive at peace with foreign nations.'56 With respect to total war, Beck has left behind a remarkable testimony to the various uses to which Clausewitz was put. In 1938 he had remained content with the charge that no one, however much a genius he might fancy himself, could, as the dictates of total war required, be a modern Napoleon, commanding both the military and political aspects of a future war. Two years later he set forth the usual opinion that Clausewitzian absolute war dominated military thinking and had found its realization and expansion in total war.57 In June 1942, however, he delivered a lecture before the Mittwochsgesellschaft, a distinguished intellectual gathering of which he was a member, in Berlin. Here he attacked the Ludendorffian concept of total war and argued for a return to the diversity and therefore limitation of war in the sense that Clausewitz had depicted.
Whereas Clausewitz thought of absolute war as being an abstract, philosophical concept, Beck accurately noted, Ludendorff and the other prophets of total war mistook this conception for a new form that war takes on in reality, one which excludes all other types of conflict. He suggested that Ludendorff diverged from Clausewitz in that, failing to understand the theoretical nature of absolute war, he attempted to impose this purely logical concept directly on reality. Of total war and Ludendorff, he said:
With the creation of this new, exclusive concept, he is forced -to use the Clausewitzian expression -to extremes by moving in the abstract realm of pure concepts. These extremes are nothing but a play of ideas and prevent the return from abstraction to reality. Only through this return do the probabilities of real life replace the most radical and absolute aspects of the concept and only thus is the strict law according to which force must always tend toward the utmost invalidated for the entire military act.58
A very concrete manifestation of Beck's rejection of total war ideology may be found in his approach to the question of its motives. In a memorandum from 2 January 1940, he noted that in his New Year's address Hitler had told the army that the coming struggle would be a matter of life or death. To this Beck replied that, although Germany's position could and should be much improved in many respects, Neither our own situation, nor the desire of the people, nor our enemies force the German people into a struggle over existence or non-existence. In these circumstances, intentions to force, or beliefs that one is obliged to force, the German people through a fight for existence or non-existence, over matters actually or supposedly essential to its survival . . . can no longer be described with the vocabulary appropriate for politics and strategy and place themselves beyond the pale of the laws which govern these areas.59
Another, perhaps the most remarkable document on Clausewitz from this period, was left by the historian Gerhard Ritter who was a member of an anti-Nazi circle of conservative academics and theologians in Freiburg. 
VI
The usual attempts to determine the intellectual origins of National Socialism, in particular the Sammelsurium of prejudices, Lebensphilosophie and snippets of fact, bound together by the glue of pseudo-scientific pretension that passed for a coherent view of things in Hitler's mind, take place in a manner which can perhaps best be described as an intellectual police line-up. As a row of suspicious, unpleasant, perverse or merely asocial thinkers squint and sweat under the blinding glare of arclights, historians, armed with a knowledge of Hitler's intellectual deviations, search their faces for tell-tale similarities. Nietzsche, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Gobineau, Wagner and so forth have all been picked out in much this fashion and damned accordingly. Conversely, when attempting to rehabilitate any such figure, it has usually been necessary to argue at great length and with much subtlety that in his work can be discerned a certain core of thought which, when divested of its nebula of contradictions and reversals, may not rightly be confused with the misinterpretations foisted on it by the likes of Hitler. Such is the way, for example, in which Walter Kaufmann has rehabilitated Nietzsche. This may be a valid approach in some abstract sense, but it rests on a -for the historian -fruitless attachment to questions of timeless verity in favour of the misunderstandings, questionable associations and unjustified appropriations that characterize the thinking of those who shape the not so lofty aspects of the world. The true Nietzsche, the essential Wagner, or whatever, cleansed of his sins, sits purified in the academician's heaven while his mortal coil is dismissed as of only secondary importance and left to the scavengers to rip apart.
Clausewitz has borne the brunt of both these efforts: damnation and rehabilitation. Neither is convincing, though not because the Nazis did not, in fact, misuse his thought or because Beck and Ritter did not tend to go back to the heart of his thinking. Clausewitz's ambiguity facilitated misinterpretation; it did not cause it. The problem is more fundamental. Those who had power did not learn from Clausewitz, but sewed his name like a fashionable label into their pirated, imitative intellectual vestments which would not have differed substantially in cut or quality had he never existed. Those who may have learned from him were not men in a position to have much effect: hesitant conspirators, incapable of acting until threatened with catastrophe; scholars writing for each other and posterity. Clausewitz, in other words, is not as important or interesting in this context and time as those who used him, the ways in which they did so and the reasons why. The really intriguing question concerns the extent to which this may be said of all similar figures.
Notes
I am indebted to Ernest R. May and Agnieszka Kolakowska for comments and suggestions, both substantive and stylistic.
